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The Woman's Right to Know: A Model
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of Abortion
Susan Oliver Renfer*
Randal Shaheen
and Michael Hegarty*
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, physicians have encountered few restraints con-
cerning the manner in which they examined, consulted with, and
treated their patients. The hippocratic oath and the AMA Princi-
ples of Medical Ethics perhaps have provided the physician's only
guidelines. Today, however, a movement aimed at providing the
patient with more information and a greater role in determining
the proper course of medical treatment is replacing "physician-
dominated" medical decision making. Malpractice actions, and in
particular actions based on a lack of informed consent, are an im-
portant factor driving this movement. Indeed, states have begun
legislating specific informed consent requirements for many medi-
cal procedures, including sterilization, treatment for breast cancer,
and AIDS testing.
Abortion is one procedure for which states have enacted in-
formed consent provisions. The subject of abortion has been swept
up in a storm of moral and legal controversy largely unrelated to a
woman's need for information that would enable her to make an
informed choice concerning medical treatment. The United States
Supreme Court generally has rejected state attempts to impose in-
formed consent requirements for abortions. However, the Court's
recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services ' appears
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1. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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to recognize that states have significant authority to regulate medi-
cal standards for abortion practice. Webster touched off new state
efforts to regulate abortions, including statutes that require the
physician to obtain a patient's informed consent prior to perform-
ing the abortion.2
In light of such efforts, this Article offers a Model Woman's In-
formed Choices Act 3 (the "Model Act") drafted to address many,
if not all, obstacles upon which other similar statutes stumbled in
previous court cases. The Model Act is designed to ensure not
only the well-being of a pregnant woman, but also that the woman,
in deciding whether to have an abortion, does not make her choice
without being fully informed of the potential risks and conse-
quences of her decision upon herself and the fetus she carries. The
state, this Article will argue, has the right to ensure that this deci-
sion, which many view as one involving the taking of human life, is
carefully weighed and fully informed.
In addition, the Article will argue that the Supreme Court has
been unduly restrictive in evaluating the nature and importance of
a woman's interest in the effective administration of informed con-
sent statutes in the abortion context. Specifically, the Article sug-
gests that the Court has placed too little.value on a state's right to
protect the well-being of women in the health care setting; has
failed to affirm the right of legislatures to ensure that fully in-
formed and reasoned decisions are made on health care issues of
great importance; has overlooked extensive state regulation of in-
formed consent outside the abortion area; and, in its zeal to protect
the right to abortion, has in effect created a right of doctors and
their employees to practice medicine free from the state's
oversight.
II. INFORMED CONSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Doctrine of Informed Consent
The Supreme Court has long recognized the power of a state to
protect the health of its citizens through the exercise of legislative
authority, including regulation of the medical profession.4 This au-
2. E-g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3205(a) (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1990). In the
first quarter of 1991, North Dakota and Mississippi enacted statutes similar to the Model
Act. Act of April 1, 1991, 1991 N.D. LAWS - (available on WESTLAW, ND-LEGIS
library, formerly H.B. 1579); Act of March 28, 1991, Pub. Ch. 439, 1991 MISS. LAWS -
(available on WESTLAW, MS-LEGIS library, formerly H.B. 982).
3. The text of the Model Woman's Informed Choices Act appears in the Appendix to
this Article.
4. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (affirming conviction for practice of
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thority derives from the state's right to provide for the general wel-
fare of its residents. 5 The common law in most states requires
physicians or health care providers to obtain a patient's informed
consent prior to treatment, and many states have enacted informed
consent statutes for medical procedures.6 Although the informed
consent requirement is not one of long standing,7 it is now firmly
rooted." Additionally, the right to be informed should not be
medicine without state registration), quoted in Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A
Refinement, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 329, 352 (1988).
5. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889), quoted in Jipping, supra note 4, at
352. That right, in turn, derives from the state's police powers. Jipping, supra note 4, at
352.
6. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-563
(1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-206 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2670.5-2674 (West
1982 & Supp. 1990) (prisoners' right to give informed consent to organic therapy); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 13-20-401 to -402 (1989) (written informed consent needed for electrocon-
vulsive treatments); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (1989); FLA. STAT. § 766.103
(1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3 (1985); IDAHO
CODE §§ 39-4301-4306 (1985 & Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE § 147.137 (Supp. 1989); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-320 (Baldwin 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40
(West 1977 & Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2905 to 2905-A (1990);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70E (West 1983) (health care patients "have the
right.., to informed consent to the extent provided by law"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.20201 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990) (health care patients' right to give informed con-
sent to treatment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990) (health care
patients' right to give informed consent to treatment); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 198.088
(Vernon 1983) (nursing home patients' right to give informed consent to experimental
treatment); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2816 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.110 (1987);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.710 (1987) (health care patients' right to give informed consent
to treatment); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-C:1 to C:2 (1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 2440-2446 (McKinney 1985) (right to give informed consent to experimental
research); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1990); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Anderson 1981 &
Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 441.605 (1989) (nursing home patients' right to give in-
formed consent to treatment); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1989); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (1980); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.01-.07 (Vernon Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-14-5 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-
234 to -235 (1984 & Supp. 1990) (informed consent must be obtained in order to conduct
human research); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.050-.060 (Supp. 1990).
7. Although one frequently-cited early case is Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hosps., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) ("[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body"),
arguably, the tort did not become "mainstream" until 1972, when Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), was decided. For the informed consent doctrine's history
preceding Canterbury, see R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 116-33 (1986); see also F. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE §§ 1.2-.3 (1990); Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the De-
cision-Making Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163, 175-78 (1984); Jipping, supra note 4, at
356-63.
8. See F. ROZOVSKY, supra note 7, § 1.1, at 4 (what "informed consent" means in
various settings).
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viewed as unique to medicine, but rather as a natural extension of
this century's consumer rights movement. 9
The concept of informed consent espoused in this Article is
straightforward. To ensure a patient's informed consent to medi-
cal treatment, the doctor, or a qualified employee, should fully in-
form the patient of the probable outcome of the treatment, the
risks and benefits of the treatment, and the risks and benefits of any
alternative forms of treatment, including nontreatment. 10
Basically, two competing informed consent disclosure standards
exist." The older one, known as the "medical community" stan-
dard, is tailored to the needs of the physician. 12 Under that stan-
dard, the doctor decides how much to tell the patient and remains
free from liability if the doctor imparts the amount of information
reasonable for that area or locality. 13 To prevail in a civil suit, a
wronged patient must persuade another doctor from that commu-
nity to testify as an expert witness against the alleged malpracticing
peer. I4 Commentators criticize this standard for its outdated "pa-
ternalistic belief that doctor knows best."' 15
In contrast, the other, more recent, standard, known as the "pa-
tient autonomy" standard, derives from the patient's right of self-
determination. 16 This standard was first detailed in Canterbury v.
Spence,'7 in which the court rejected the argument that a physician
should be able to withhold relevant information, stating that the
physician has a duty to divulge "all risks potentially affecting the
decision."' 8 This standard also drops the expert witness require-
ment because in some instances the community custom may be "to
maintain silence and refuse to testify," thereby unjustly thwarting
the adjudication of valid rights of action. '9 The trend appears to be
9. Dobson, Achieving Better Medical Outcomes and Reducing Litigation Through the
Healthcare Consumer's Right to Make Decisions, 15 J. CONTEMp. L. 175, 196-201 (1989).
10. F. RozOVSKY, supra note 7, § 1.12.1, at 45-47; Andrews, supra note 7, at 178;
Campenella, Breast Cancer: Staging; Treatment, and the Duty to Inform, 35 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 17, 29-30 (1989).
11. F. ROZOVSKY, supra note 7, §§ 1.13.1-.2; Jipping, supra note 4, at 356-60.
12. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 419 (5th Cir. 1974); Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 409-10, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960).
13. F. RoZOVSKY, supra note 7, § 1.13.1; Jipping, supra note 4, at 357; Trichter,
Informed Consent: The Patient as an Individual, 15 FORUM 455, 457 (1979-80).
14. F. RozovsKY, supra note 7, § 1.18; Jipping, supra note 4, at 357; Trichter, supra
note 13, at 457.
15. Trichter, supra note 13, at 459.
16. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
17. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
18. Id. at 787.
19. Id. at 784.
412 [Vol. 22
1991] Woman's Right to Know
toward the patient autonomy standard.20
The patient autonomy standard is preferable to the medical com-
munity standard for several reasons. First, a broader disclosure
process results in better treatment for the patient. 21 Patient partici-
pation in the treatment process may lessen pretreatment or pre-
operative worry, encourage cooperation in determining the
treatment plan (if any), and speed postprocedure recovery. 22 A de-
tailed explanation of the procedure and its aftermath can lead to an
understanding not achieved with a cursory description.2 a Second,
patient autonomy is a logical continuation of the emerging move-
ment to protect consumers from harmful and inferior goods and
services. 24 Arguably, the medical community should be held not
only to this newer level of responsibility, but to an even higher
standard because of the often irreversible nature of treatment ren-
dered. Third, a broader disclosure process protects the physician
from the patient's anger (and litigation) if treatment fails. 25
Knowledge about alternatives also reduces the probability that the
patient will later have "second thoughts" about the treatment.26
20. Jipping, supra note 4, at 360-61.
21. Trichter, supra note 13, at 464.
22. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 165-68; see also NATIONAL ABORTION FED'N,
STANDARDS FOR ABORTION CARE 4 (1987) (objectives of informed consent). In con-
trast, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), although citing no supporting scien-
tific or medical authority, alleged that disclosures of risks "compound the problem of
medical attendance [and] increase the patient's anxiety," thereby rendering such disclo-
sure "the antithesis of informed consent." Id. at 764. Justice White, in his Thornburgh
dissent, disagreed:
It is in the very nature of informed-consent provisions that they may produce
some anxiety in the patient and influence her in her choice. This is in fact their
reason for existence .... If information may reasonably affect the patient's
choice, the patient should have that information; and, as one authority has ob-
served, "the greater the likelihood that particular information will influence
[the patient's] decision, the more essential the information arguably becomes for
securing her informed consent." That the result of the provision of information
may be that some women will forego abortions by no means suggests that pro-
viding the information is unconstitutional, for the ostensible objective of Roe v.
Wade is not maximizing the number of abortions, but maximizing choice.
Id. at 801 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Appleton, Doctors, Patients, and the Constitu-
tion, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 183, 211 (1985)).
23. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 165; cf id. at 199 (breast cancer patients had better
recall and understanding of information presented when allowed to take material home).
24. Dobson, supra note 9, at 197 n.165; see also U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -316.
25. Campenella, supra note 10, at 32-33; Dobson, supra note 9, at 200, 201.
26. Dobson, supra note 9, at 200; see also, e.g., Abortion: A Special Report, USA
Today, Apr. 26, 1989, Special Advertising Insert at 2, col. 1 [hereinafter Special Report]
(quoting one Sandra D. Walton: "[i]f only someone had been there to give me the facts
about the child inside me ... I could have been spared the haunting grief and guilt").
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The patient, because she bears the consequences of the medical
treatment, becomes the ultimate decision maker.27
As part of the trend toward greater patient autonomy and regu-
lation of medical providers, a number of states and localities have
attempted to enact informed consent statutes for abortion. State
regulation of informed consent for abortion is particularly appro-
priate. Not only is abortion elective, it is also irreversible. Par-
tially informed decisions to abort may lead to subsequent harm,
both physical and emotional, for the woman.2" Additionally, the
Supreme Court recognizes the uniqueness of the abortion decision:
"[a]bortion is inherently different from other medical procedures,
because no other procedure involves the purposeful termination of
potential life."' 29 All of these reasons, but especially the fact that
the procedure results in what many people believe is the taking of a
human life, mandate full and complete discussion of the facts,
risks, and benefits of the procedure and its alternatives before a
woman makes a decision to proceed with an abortion.
Indeed, several publications written for abortion providers stress
the importance of obtaining the woman's informed consent prior to
the procedure. The National Abortion Federation (NAF), "an or-
ganization specifically committed to the provision and accessibility
of high quality abortion services," encourages exploration of all
possible outcomes. 30 The NAF urges discussion of the procedure
and its concomitant risks and benefits to provide "the woman with
accurate information. "31
This advice is echoed in what has become the standard hand-
book for physicians who perform abortions. 2 The recommended
consent form contained therein details some specific risks of the
procedure.33 Further, the American College of Obstetricians and
27. Trichter, supra note 13, at 461 ("[iln actuality, it is the patient who bears the risk
in all medical procedures") (emphasis in original).
28. For examples, see Special Report, supra note 26:
Karen Cross: "I didn't realize the impact [that my abortions] would have on
my life, and the nightmares that would come."
Sandra D. Walton: "Those few minutes scarred me for the rest of my life."
Teresa L. Fangman: "I'm not sure the tears will ever stop. I've been waiting
almost 11 years now and they never seem to cease."
See also D. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN: SILENT No MORE 89-160 (1987).
29. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
30. NATIONAL ABORTION FED'N, supra note 22, Foreword.
31. Id. at 4.
32. W. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE (1984).
33. Id. at 270-71.
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Gynecologists (ACOG) recommends "options" counseling.34 Such
counseling includes a full disclosure of the procedure, including the
nature of the treatment, its risks and benefits, alternatives to abor-
tion, and an opportunity for the woman to ask questions. a The
ACOG asserts that the woman should also "be allowed sufficient
time for reflection prior to making an informed decision. "36 The
Model Act provides a vehicle whereby a state and the woman her-
self may ensure that consent to an abortion is truly informed.
B. General Framework of Supreme Court Decisions on Informed
Consent for Abortion
In its earliest review of an informed consent for abortion statute,
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,37 the Court established a state's
right to require written consent to the abortion procedure, even
when the state requires such consent for few or no other medical
procedures a.3  The Court justified this holding on the grounds of
the "imperative" need for full knowledge of the nature and conse-
quences of abortion due to the stressful nature of the decision to
abort.39 The Court appeared to rely upon a rational basis analysis,
further noting that a state can require written consent for proce-
dures that involve significant risk to the patient (e.g., intracardiac
procedure or whenever the surgical risk is elevated above a speci-
fied mortality rate).4°
In its next major review of an informed consent for abortion law,
the Court appeared to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny. In
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,4I the
Court reaffirmed its Danforth decision, noting the importance of
written consent in furthering important health-related state
34. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, STANDARDS FOR
OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC SERVICES 63 (6th ed. 1985).
35. Id. at 84.
36. Id.
37. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
38. Id. at 66-67.
39. Id. at 67. In fact, Planned Parenthood coined the phrase "options counseling" in
an attempt to ensure that abortion counseling and referral services are provided to wo-
men dealing with problem pregnancies. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Kempiners, 700
F.2d 1115 (7th Cir.), on remand, 568 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. Ill. 1983). But when the
situation has been reversed and opponents of abortion have sought to include childbirth
and adoption information in the "options counseling" given to women at abortion clinics,
Planned Parenthood has litigated to block the dissemination of such information. See
infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
40. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67.
41. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
1991]
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concerns.
42
However, the Akron Court struck down a city ordinance that set
forth, in detail, the information that the attending physician was
required to convey to the woman.43 The ordinance required the
physician to tell the woman that her unborn child is a human life
from the moment of conception. Further, the preamble to the or-
dinance stated that the City Council of Akron had found that
"there is no point in time between the union of the sperm and egg,
or at least the blastocyst stage and the birth of the infant at which
point we can say the unborn child is not a human life."" The
Court held that this language was designed "not to inform the wo-
man's consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it
altogether. 4
The Court also believed that the required dissemination of infor-
mation intruded upon the "discretion of the pregnant woman's
physician."'  The Akron Court reiterated prior holdings stating
that (1) "because abortion is a medical procedure,. . . the full vin-
dication of the woman's fundamental right necessarily requires
that her physician be given 'the room he needs to make his best
medical judgment,' "47 and (2) "[t]he physician's exercise of this
medical judgment encompasses both assisting the woman in the
42. Id. at 430. The Danforth decision did not appear to impose a heightened burden
on the state. The Akron Court further noted, however, that during the second trimester,
the state's regulation need only be "legitimately" or "reasonably" related to its health
objective. Id. at 430-31.
43. Id. at 44445. The ordinance required the attending physician to disclose to the
patient: (1) that she is pregnant; (2) the number of weeks elapsed from the probable time
of conception, based upon the number of weeks since her last menstrual period or upon a
history, physical examination, and appropriate laboratory tests; (3) that the unborn child
is a human life from the moment of conception, along with a description of the anatomi-
cal and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at that particular gestational
point, including appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity (pain, perception, or response),
brain and heart function, presence of internal organs, and presence of external members;
(4) that the unborn child may be capable of surviving outside the womb in those instances
when the physician determines gestational age to be more than 22 weeks and, therefore,
the physician has a legal obligation to take all reasonable steps to preserve the life and
health of the unborn child during the abortion; (5) that abortion is a major surgical pro-
cedure that can result in serious complications and may leave unaffected or worsen any
existing psychological problems, or result in severe emotional disturbances; (6) that nu-
merous public and private agencies and services are available to provide birth control
information, a list of which the physician will provide upon request; and (7) that numer-
ous public and private agencies and services are available to assist during the woman's
pregnancy and after the birth of the child, a list of which the physician will provide upon
request. Id. at 423 n.5.
44. Id. at 421 n.l.
45. Id. at 444.
46. Id. at 445.
47. Id. at 427 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1983)).
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decisionmaking process and implementing her decision should she
choose abortion. '48
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided another major
case involving an informed consent statute in Thornburgh v. Amer-
ican College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 9 A Pennsylvania
informed consent statute required physicians and others to provide
certain information to a woman at least twenty-four hours prior to
her giving consent.5 0 The Court struck down this provision, rely-
ing upon the Akron Court's determination that such a provision is
intended to dissuade a woman from having an abortion, and that it
also intrudes upon physician-patient relationships.5
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger, who had joined the Roe v.
Wade52 majority thirteen years earlier, expressed dismay at the
Court's expansion of the abortion right and the striking of in-
formed consent statutes:
Can anyone doubt that the State could impose a similar require-
ment with respect to other medical procedures? Can anyone
48. Id. (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979)).
49. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
50. The Pennsylvania act required that the woman be told the following:
(a) the name of the physician who will perform the abortion, (b) the "fact that
there may be detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not accu-
rately foreseeable," (c) the "particular medical risks associated with the particu-
lar abortion procedure to be employed," (d) the probable gestational age,... (e)
the "medical risks associated with carrying her child to term" ... (f) the "fact
that medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, childbirth
and neonatal care," and (g) the "fact that the father is liable to assist" in the
child's support, "even in instances where the father has offered to pay for the
abortion."
Id. at 760-61. The first five of these had to be disclosed by a physician. Id at 760. The
statute also mandated that the woman be informed of, and be provided upon request,
materials describing the fetus and listing the agencies offering alternatives to abortion.
Id. at 761.
51. Id. at 762-65. The procedural aspects surrounding the Court's review of the
Pennsylvania Act were circumspect. See Grant, Abortion and the Constitution: The Im-
pact of Thornburgh on the Strategy to Reverse Roe v. Wade, in ABORTION AND THE
CONsTrruTION: REVERSING Roe v. Wade THROUGH THE COURTS 251-52 (1987). The
parties hurriedly prepared for a preliminary injunction hearing before the district court
over a two-week period that included Thanksgiving. After the trial court entered a pre-
liminary injunction, the court of appeals took the highly unusual step of permanently
enjoining the statute.
Justice O'Connor sharply disagreed with the Court's judgment in addressing the merits
of the case. She argued that the proper course would have been to remand the case to the
district court, allow for a trial on the merits, and then review if necessary. Thornburgh,
476 U.S. at 815 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor concluded that if the case
had not concerned state regulation of abortion, "it may be doubted that the Court would
entertain, let alone adopt, such a departure from its precedents." Id. at 826 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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doubt that doctors routinely give similar information concerning
risks in countless procedures having far less impact on life and
health, both physical and emotional than an abortion, and risk a
malpractice lawsuit if they fail to do so?
Yet the Court concludes that the State cannot impose this sim-
ple information-dispensing requirement in the abortion context
where the decision is fraught with serious physical, psychologi-
cal, and moral concerns of the highest order. Can it possibly be
that the Court is saying that the Constitution forbids the commu-
nication of such critical information to a woman?5 3
Justices White and Rehnquist also dissented in Thornburgh.
They dismissed the majority's argument that the information was
unconstitutional because it might "increase the woman's 'anxiety'
about the procedure and even 'influence' her in her choice."' 54 Ac-
cording to Justices White and Rehnquist, such information serves
a valuable role."
More recently, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,56 a
plurality of the Court abandoned the Roe framework and stated
that a woman's decision whether or not to abort her child is not a
"fundamental right," as the Court described it in Akron, but rather
a liberty interest protected by the due process clause.57 The plural-
ity argued that a court must weigh this liberty interest against the
state's compelling interest in protecting potential human life, an
interest present not only at the point of viability, but throughout
the pregnancy."
Under the Webster analysis, many if not all of the informed con-
sent provisions in Akron and Thornburgh would have survived.59
Indeed, the plurality cited with approval the dissents in Thorn-
53. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 801 (White, J., dissenting).
55. See quotation from Justice White's Thornburgh dissent, supra note 22.
56. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
57. Id. at 3058.
58. Id. at 3056-58.
59. See Wardle, Time Enough: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and the
Prudent Pace of Justice, 41 FLA. L. REv. 881, 914-16 (1990). The Court is now more
receptive to the state's interpretation of challenged statutes. It has "repudiated the 'bad
intent' principle applied in Thornburgh and Akron.... The likelihood that otherwise
valid state legislation is intended to deter or will deter some women from choosing abor-
tion is no longer an acceptable reason for courts to strike down abortion legislation." Id.
at 914-15. Further, three of the present Justices (O'Connor, White, and Rehnquist) dis-
sented in Akron and Thornburgh. A fourth, Justice Scalia, would overrule Roe itself,
while Justice Kennedy, and recently Justice Souter, have voted to uphold reasonable reg-
ulation of abortion rights.
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burgh.' The following sections of this Article will argue that
under such a balancing test, requirements such as fetal description,
a short waiting period, and mandatory disclosure of certain risks
further the legitimate state interest in preserving potential human
life by ensuring that any abortion decision is carefully weighed,
while minimally burdening the abortion right.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL WOMAN'S INFORMED
CHOICES ACT
A. Section 2-Legislative Purposes and Findings
As a general proposition, legislative statements of "findings and
purposes" do not, by their own terms, regulate the conduct of the
persons affected by the remaining statute.6' Nonetheless, such
"findings and purposes" serve a valuable role for the public, and
any court that reviews the legislation, as an expression of the state
interests intended to be protected.62
In Webster, the Court refused to invalidate a legislative finding
that human life begins at conception.63 The Court recognized that
a preamble might be used to interpret state statutes or regulations.
However, when the preamble is not used in a manner prohibited by
the Constitution, the Court determined that review of the preamble
is not a ripe issue.64
Sections 2(A) and (B) of the Model Act focus principally on a
woman's right to receive accurate, truthful information prior to the
decision to abort. This right to information is consistent with the
Court's conclusion that the decision to abort "is an important, and
often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be
made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. "65
60. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057. Two of the three Justices in the Webster plurality
were dissenters in the earlier informed consent cases.
61. See id. at 3050; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 302-03 &
n.9 (2d ed. 1988).
62. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct.
2426 (1990), noted the confusion surrounding the Minnesota statute because it did not
contain a statement of its purposes. Justice Stevens pointed out that the Minnesota At-
torney General had advised the Court that the purposes were apparent from the statutory
text. The district court, however, found the purposes to be different from those set forth
by the Attorney General. Id. at 2933.
63. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3049-50. In addition to its determination that the preamble
did not raise a ripe constitutional issue, the Court reiterated that a state has authority to
" 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.'" Id. at 3050 (quoting
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
64. Id. at 3050.
65. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976).
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Consistent with Section 2(C) of the Model Act, the Court has
also recognized that consideration of a woman's psychological and
physical well-being is a valid concern in the context of abortion:
The decision to have an abortion has "implications far broader
than those associated with most other kinds of medical treat-
ment," and thus the State legitimately may seek to ensure that it
has been made "in the light of all attendant circumstances-psy-
chological and emotional as well as physical-that might be rele-
vant to the well-being of the patient. ' '6"
Section 2(D) makes findings concerning the nonexistence of the
physician-patient relationship in the context of abortion. Approxi-
mately eighty percent of abortions are performed in free-standing
clinics.67 Other than pregnancy testing, the piimary business of
such clinics is to perform abortions.68 Normally, women who un-
dergo an abortion at a free-standing abortion clinic do not return
to the clinic for follow-up care, nor do they continue a physician-
patient relationship with the physician who performed the abor-
tion.69 As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her Akron dissent, "the
record in this case shows that the [physician-patient] relationship is
nonexistent. ' 70 In fact, the woman's first encounter with the phy-
66. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443
(1983) (citations omitted).
67. Torres & Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169,
n.* (1988) (nonhospital facilities that performed 400 or more abortions in a year--only
26% of all abortion providers--accounted for 81% of the procedures).
68. "'Look,' said hot-line operator Valerie McCullough, 'no matter how you put it,
we're in the business of selling abortions.... Use a positive approach. It's not, "Do you
want a termination, but when?" '" Zekman & Warrick, The Abortion Profiteers, Chicago
Sun-Times, Nov. 12, 1978, at 4, col. 3. "To keep his business booming, [one clinic owner]
pays his employees $5 cash bonuses for every abortion they sell over the phones."
Zekman & Warrick, Meet the Profiteers, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 13, 1978, at 5, col. 3.
69. Iffy, Second Trimester Abortions, 249 J. A.M.A. 588 (1983) (letter to the editor).
70. Akron, 462 U.S. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court's reliance, from
Roe onward, on the physician's judgment to deter or encourage abortions (depending on
the individual patient) is not only misplaced, but also wrong. There is no incentive for an
abortion clinic physician to turn away a woman seeking an abortion. The only limitation
that can be brought upon the abortionist must come from the state, and most states,
notwithstanding Webster, are hesitant or do not have the resources to monitor the clinics.
Cf Sontag, Do Not Enter, Miami Herald, Sept. 17, 1989, Tropic, at 8, col. 1 (continued
existence of a dangerously unhealthy clinic despite numerous injuries, malpractice suits,
and even deaths). Furthermore, to make the physician the responsible party severely
undermines the ability of the patient to choose the best treatment for her unwanted preg-
nancy. See Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization
Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 51, 55
(1983). See generally Appleton, Doctors, Patients and the Constitution: A Theoretical
Analysis of the Physician's Role in "'Private" Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U.L.Q.
183 (1985); Appleton, More Thoughts on the Physician's Constitutional Role in Abortion
and Related Choices, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 499 (1988).
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sician who performs the abortion in the free-standing clinic often
occurs when she is gowned and on the operating table, after she
already has made the decision to have the abortion.7 ' This lack of
a physician-patient relationship is further supported by the testi-
mony of persons formerly associated with the abortion industry
and women who have had abortions.'2
Section 2(E) is the legislature's acknowledgment of its interest in
protecting unborn life throughout a woman's pregnancy. Justice
O'Connor, in her Akron dissent, which she reaffirmed in her opin-
ions in Thornburgh and Webster, stated that "the State's interest in
protecting potential human life exists throughout the preg-
nancy.' 73 Furthermore, the Supreme Court consistently has held
that a state has authority to "make value judgments favoring child-
birth over abortion.' 74 By requiring that a woman receive suffi-
cient factual information regarding the developmental
characteristics of her unborn child, section 2(F) is consistent with
the state's legitimate right to insure that any decision against child-
birth is a fully informed one.
Section 2(G) is a prelude to the substantive provisions of the
Model Act. Under the standards announced in the Court's abor-
tion decisions, these provisions "must be 'legitimately related to
the objectives that the state seeks to accomplish' ",76 and may not
interfere unreasonably with the woman's right to choose an
abortion."
As noted earlier, legislative purposes and findings serve to edu-
cate other members of the legislature, as well as the public at large,
71. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 91 n.2. "A 25-year-old rape victim waited [six hours] for
her abortion .... When she finally saw the doctor, it was just for four minutes-the time
he took to perform the abortion." Zeckman & Warrick, The Abortion Profiteers, Chicago
Sun-Times, Nov. 12, 1978, at 6, col. 2.
72. The Right to Privacy and Reproductive Freedom: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) (statement of Carol Everett) (on a busy day, a doctor could perform 10 to 12
first-trimester abortions in an hour).
73. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3063 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Akron, 462 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
74. Rust v. Sullivan, Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392 (May 23, 1991) (WESTLAW, SCT li-
brary). Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
75. Cf Smolin, Abortion Legislation After Webster v. Reproductive Health Services"
Model Statutes and Commentaries, 20 CUMB. L. REv. 71, 141-42 (1989) (abortion clinics
will provide this information only if required by law).
76. Eg., Akron, 462 U.S. at 431 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195 (1973)).
77. Id. at 430-31.
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regarding the actual need for such legislation.7 s In addition to the
legislative purposes and findings in the Model Act, legislatures
should feel free to add additional purposes if appropriate.
This Article next analyzes the Model-Act's operative provisions
and demonstrates that each is legitimately related to the state's
valid interest in protecting the life and health of the pregnant wo-
man and her unborn child. It also examines whether the substan-
tive provisions of the Model Act present any unreasonable
obstacles to obtaining an abortion.
B. Section 3-Definitions
Section 3(A)'s definition of abortion is substantially similar to
standard definitions that have withstood attacks for vagueness.79
The phrase "known to be pregnant" is intended to avoid prohibi-
tion of existing or potential contraceptives, such as the "morning-
after pill."' 0
The Supreme Court upheld the definition of viability as used in
Section 3(C). In Danforth, the Court approved a Missouri provi-
sion defining viability as "that stage of fetal development .when the
life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the
womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems."81 The Court
noted that the statute's language placed viability (i.e., life contin-
ued indefinitely) at, perhaps, a later stage in the pregnancy than
had Roe, in which viability was defined as the point at which the
fetus is "'potentially able to live outside the mother's womb.' "82
The Model Act chooses the Roe definition.
Section 3(E), which allows a "qualified person assisting the phy-
sician" to counsel the woman, is needed because the Court recog-
nized in Akron that the performance of certain functions relating
to informed consent may not constitutionally be limited to physi-
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 787-89 (7th Cir. 1980).
80. The Model Act's definition of abortion would, however, extend to the abortifa-
cient RU486 (mifepristone). RU486 breaks down the uterine lining and causes it to be
expelled, usually carrying the fertilized egg, or embryo (depending on when the drug was
given), with it. Cherfas, Stopping the Process of Pregnancy, 245 Sci. 1320 (1989). In
France, the only country in which RU486 is legally sold, the drug can be taken through
the seventh week of pregnancy. Ulmann, Teutsch, & Philibert, R U 486, 262 Sci. AM. 42,
48 (1990). RU486 has also been mentioned as a possible improved method of aborting
third-trimester pregnancies. Id. at 47; Cherfas & Palca, Hormone Antagonist with Broad
Potential, 245 Sci. 1322 (1989).,
81. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976).
82. Id. at 64 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973)).
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cians.8 3 The Court held that the state "may establish reasonable
minimum qualifications for those people who perform the primary
counseling function."'" Section 3(E) establishes these
qualifications.
C. Section 4-Voluntary and Informed Choice
The Supreme Court consistently recognizes the significance of
the act of abortion and the often stressful circumstances under
which the decision is made:
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stress-
ful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with the
full knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is the
one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the decision and
its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to
the extent of requiring her prior written consent.85
1. Risks from Abortion
Abortion counseling about possible risks makes good medical
sense. Approximately twenty percent of all abortion patients suffer
psychologically from the abortion experience, 6 and as many as five
percent more suffer physically from the procedure.8 7 Physical
complications increase with the number of prior induced abor-
tions.88 Counseling helps the patient not only to readjust after the
procedure, but also helps her prepare for it.89 Inadequate counsel-
ing injures women by not informing them of all the risks and bene-
fits of the treatment. 9' Unfortunately, as one recent commentary
on abortion and informed consent stated, between ten and twenty-
five percent of all abortion patients do not receive pre-abortion
83. Akron, 462 U.S. at 445 n.37.
84. Id. at 449.
85. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). The Supreme Court
has previously upheld the constitutionality of informing the patient of the following facts,
which are included in the Model Act: (I) that she is pregnant (Section 4(B)(i)); (2) that
the patient is free to withhold or withdraw her consent (Section 4(B)(iii)); (3) the number
of weeks elapsed from conception (Section 4(B)(v)); and (4) the availability of adoption as
an alternative (Section 4(B)(x)). See Akron, 462 U.S. at 445 n.37.
86. Note, Abortion Counseling:. To Benefit Maternal Health, 15 AM. J.L. & MED.
483, 487 (1989).
87. See infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 98. About 43% of all abortions are repeat procedures. Brotman,
Repeat Abortions Open Complex Issue, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 25, 1990, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
89. Note, supra note 86, at 492.
90. Id. at 493.
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counseling.9" Thus, the state has a clear interest in protecting by
statute against an ill-informed decision.
Section 4(B)(iv) of the Model Act provides for the disclosure of
specific risks to the patient. This section requires that the woman
be told:
That abortion is a medical procedure with certain foreseeable
physical and psychological risks, including
(a) retained tissue of conception;92
(b) damage to the cervix;"
(c) hemorrhage; 94
(d) infection;95
(e) perforation of the uterus;96
(f) sterility;9
7
91. Id. at 487. Using the standard figure of 1.5 million abortions per year in the
United States, id. at 483, this represents 150,000 to 425,000 women.
92. W. HERN, supra note 32, at 180-81, 270; Chung, Smith, Steinhoff & Mi, Induced
Abortion and Ectopic Pregnancies in Subsequent Pregnancies, 115 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
879, 885 (1982) (retained tissue elevates risk of future ectopic pregnancy). "Incomplete
abortions are the most common complication, occurring in one-half to one percent of all
abortions.... Generally, only small pieces of tissue are left behind, causing a patient to
bleed excessively afterward." Sontag, supra note 70, at 12, col. 1.
93. Schulz, Grimes & Cates, Measures to Prevent Cervical Injuries During Suction
Curettage Abortion, LANCET, May 28, 1983, at 1182-83 (approximately one percent of
15,438 women in study required suturing of cervical injuries from abortion procedure).
94. W. HERN, supra note 32, at 175, 270 (if hemorrhage is not controlled, patient can
quickly go into shock); Grimes, Kafrissen, O'Reilly & Binkin, Fatal Hemorrhage from
Legal Abortion in the United States, 157 SURGERY, GYN. & On. 461 (1983) (hemorrhage
is third most frequent cause of death from legal abortion).
95. W. HERN, supra note 32, at 270; Daij, Stralin & Nilsson, The Prophylactic Effect
of Doxycycline on Postoperative Infection After First Trimester Abortion, 70 OB. & GYN.
755 (1987) ("postoperative infection is a common and serious complication of induced
abortion"); Genital Tract Infection, 20 OB. GYN. NEWS 42 (1985); Jerve & Fylling, Ther-
apeutic Abortion, 57 ACTA OBSTETRICA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 237 (1978)
(pelvic inflammatory disease is a major complication after therapeutic abortion); Moberg,
Eneroth, Harlin, Ljung & Nord, Postoperative Cervical Microbial Flora and Post-Abortion
Infection, 57 ACTA OBSTETRICA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 415 (1978)
(probability of contracting a pelvic infection varies from 0.3% to 14%); Quivstag, Skarg,
Jerve, Vik & Ulstrup, Therapeutic Abortion and Chlamydia Trachomatis Infection, 58
BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASES 182 (1982) (patients harboring chlamydia trachomatis in
the cervix at termination of pregnancy are at high risk of developing postoperative
infections).
96. W. HERN, supra note 32 at 175, 270; Nathanson, The Management of Uterine
Perforation Suffered at Elective Abortion, 114 AM. J. OB. & GYN. 1054, 1055 (1972) (24
perforated uteruses out of 30,000 abortions performed); Sontag, supra note 70.
97. Adler, Belsey & O'Connor, Morbidity Associated with Pelvic Inflammatory Dis-
ease, 58 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASES 151-57 (1982) ("sterility is the most serious and
best documented complication of [pelvic inflammatory disease]"); March & Israel, In-
trauterine Adhesions Secondary to Elective Abortion, 48 OB. & GYN. 422 (1976) (sterility
following elective abortion is a significant complication).
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(g) complication of future pregnancies;98
(h) death;99
(i) posttraumatic stress disorder [also known as postabortion
syndrome]; 1° °
98. Harlap, Prospective Study of Spontaneous Fetal Losses After Induced Abortions,
301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 677 (1979) (risk of spontaneous abortion increased with number
of induced abortions); Houge, Cates & Tietze, Impact of Vacuum Aspiration Abortion on
Future Childbearing: A Review, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 119, 123 (1983) (women whose
first pregnancies were terminated were 3.4 times more likely to have a midtrimester mis-
carraige during their second pregnancy); Levin, Association of Induced Abortion with Sub-
sequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 495 (1980) (women who had two or more prior
induced abortions had a twofold to threefold increase in first-trimester miscarraige);
Levin, Ectopic Pregnancy and Prior Induced Abortion, 72 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 253
(1982) [hereinafter Levin, Ectopic Pregnancy] (after more than one abortion, proportional
relationship between the number of prior induced abortions and a subsequent ectopic
pregnancy); Repeated Abortions Increase Risk of Miscarriage, Premature Births and Low
Birth Weight Babies, 11 FAM. PLAN. PERSp. 39 (1979) (repeat abortions are associated
with a two- to two-and-a-half-fold increase in low birth weight and premature delivery in
subsequent pregnancies); Slater, Davies & Horlap, The Effect of Abortion Method on the
Outcome of Subsequent Pregnancy, 26 J. REPRODUCTIVE MED. 123 (1981) (greater per-
centages of infants born following a previous dilatation and curettage (D & C) abortion
have low birth weight); Turner, Ectopic Pregnancy Case Study, PERSP. & PROBS. IN OB/
GYN, Jan. 1985, at 9, 10-11 (after a single ectopic pregnancy a woman has only a 30%
chance of producing a live child; the risk of suffering an ectopic pregnancy increases with
the number of prior induced abortions).
99. Legal Abortion Mortality, 156 AM. J. OB. & GYN. 611 (1987) (63 reported legal
abortion deaths from 1974-78); cf. Atrash, Ectopic Pregnancy in the United States, 1970-
1983, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 225 (1986) (nearly 70,000 ectopic
pregnancies in 1983 causing 63 maternal deaths, an increase from 17,800 ectopic
pregnancies in 1970). The risk of suffering an ectopic pregnancy increases with the
number of prior induced abortions. See Levin, Ectopic Pregnancy, supra note 98, at 253.
100. Posttraumatic stress disorder results from "an event that is outside the range of
usual human experience," for example, serious threat or harm to one's child or witnessing
a violently inflicted injury or death. Speckhard & Rue, Post Abortion Syndrome: An
Emerging Public Health Concern, 47 J. Soc. ISSUES - (1991) (quoting AMERICAN PSY-
CHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL III-REVISED
§ 309.89 (1990); see also David, Rasmussen & Holst, Postpartum & Postabortion Psychotic
Reactions, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 88 (1981) (comparison of admissions to psychiatric
hospitals of women delivering babies and women obtaining abortions); Dunlop, Counsel-
ing of Patients Requesting an Abortion, 220 PRACTITIONER 847, 850 (1978) (immature
teenagers especially susceptible to the disorder); Gould, Post Abortion Depressive Reac-
tions in College Women, 28 J. AM. C. HEALTH A. 316-20 (1980); Liebman & Zimmer,
The Psychological Sequelae of Abortion: Fact and Fallacy, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL As-
PECTS OF ABORTION 127-38 (1979) (reporting 24 immediate and long-term reactions to
abortion); Mattinson, The Effects of Abortion on a Marriage, in ABORTION: MEDICAL
PROGRESS AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 115, 165-77 (1985) (couples show a delayed grief
reaction to the abortion, with many still troubled years after the abortion); Mester, In-
duced Abortion and Psychotherapy, 30 PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 98, 99
(1978) (induced abortion is a stressing experience, and women may unconsciously ignore
or minimize emotional pain); Note, supra note 86, at 487 (about 20% of abortion patients
suffer from postabortion syndrome). For one professional's perspective, see McCarthy,
Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1989, at F2, col. 1 (conversation with abortionist-psychiatrist about
postabortion syndrome):
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(j) severe depression;"0 1
(k) anniversary syndrome; 0 2
(1) sexual dysfunction;1 3 and
(m) interference with personal relationships..
Additionally, the Model Act requires that the woman be informed
of any other risks that "the physician deems relevant" and "the
degree of risk faced by the woman as to each of the [specified fore-
seeable injuries]." Unlike Thornburgh, the Model Act does not
require disclosure of all risks. Nor does it overstate the risks from
abortion by providing a list of possible adverse consequences with-
out identifying the probability of each occurring, something the
Court in Akron described as, a "parade of horribles."105 Nor does
There is no question... about the emotional grief and mourning following an
abortion. It shows up in various forms. I've had patients who had abortions
two years ago-women who did the best thing at the time for themselves--but
it still bothers them. Many burst out crying.... There is no question in my
mind that we are disturbing a life process.... A psychological price is paid....
Something happens on the deeper levels of a woman's consciousness when she
destroys a pregnancy. I know that as a psychiatrist.
101. Dunlop, supra note 100, at 850; Kent, Greenwood, Loeken & Nicholls, Emo-
tional Sequelae of Elective Abortion, 20 B.C. MED. J. 118-19 (1978) (abortion was a major
precipitant in seeking psychotherapy); Lloyd & Laurence, Sequelae and Support After
Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal Malformation, 290 BRIT. MED. J. 907, 908 (1985);
Tishler, Adolescent Suicide Attempts Following Elective Abortion: A Special Case of Anni-
versary Reaction, 68 PEDIATRICS 670, 671 (198 1) (case studies of suicide attempts due to
anniversary syndrome).
102. Cavenar, Maltbie & Sullivan, Aftermath of Abortion: Anniversary Depression
and Abdominal Pain, 42 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 433, 434 (1978) ("many psycho-
genic reactions to abortion are anniversary phenomena, motivated by incomplete or ab-
normal grieving over the loss of the fetus"); Gould, supra note 100, at 316-20; Spaulding
& Cavenar, Psychoses Following Therapeutic Abortion, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 364, 365
(1978); Tishler, supra note 101, at 670.
103. Gerrard, Sex Guilt in Abortion Patients, 45 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 708 (1977) (unmarried pregnant women planning to have abortions have more
sex guilt); cf Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PsY-
CHIATRY 117, 118 (1983) (those applying to be surrogate mothers include a substantial
number of women with unresolved psychological problems from a prior induced
abortion).
104. Dunlop, supra note 100, at 850 (immature teens especially vulnerable to with-
drawing from their peers and isolating themselves); Freeman, Rickels, Huggins, Garcia &
Polin, Emotional Distress Patterns Among Women Having First or Repeat Abortions, 55
OB. & GYN. 630, 636 (1980) (repeat aborters continue to have significantly higher emo-
tional distress scores in interpersonal relationships); Friedlander, Kaul & Stimel, Abor-
tion: Predicting the Complexity of the Decision-Making Process, 9 WOMEN & HEALTH,
1986, at 43, 53 ("many women apparently experience difficulties in decision-making
which exceed the immediate concern and may include ... problems in relationships");
Rue, Abortion in Relationship Context, INT'L REv. NAT. FAM. PLAN., Summer 1985, at
95, 121 (abortion reinforces defective problem solving); Weiner & Weiner, The Aborted
Sibling Factor: A Case Study, 12 CLINICAL SOC. WORK J. 209-15 (1984).
105. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445
(1983).
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the Act preclude the physician from independently exercising his
judgment. Rather, the Model Act requires that the physician exer-
cise his professional judgment to inform the woman of the particu-
lar threat to her of encountering certain specified risks from an
abortion, as well as any other risks that the physician believes are
relevant. In Akron, the Court upheld a similar provision requiring
that the woman be informed of the particular risks to her from an
abortion.106
Further, when one moves outside the abortion context, these
types of restrictions are commonplace and noncontroversial. In-
creasingly, states legislate specific informed consent requirements
that include the disclosure of certain specified risks for medical
procedures, such as breast cancer treatment,"0 hysterectomies,108
sterilizations,1I 9 and HIV testing 1 o
For example, California's statute regarding blood transfusions
directs the State Department of Health Services "to develop and
annually review ...a standardized written summary which ex-
plains the advantages, disadvantages, risks, and descriptions of au-
tologous blood, and directed and nondirected homologous
106. Id. at 446. It is true that some of the risks specified in the Model Act may not
apply to all patients. However, there is surely no reason why it is unconstitutional to
require that the woman be informed that certain risks are not present in her case.
107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1704.5 (West Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 458.324(2), 459.0125(2) (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-902(g) (1985 &
Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3(c) (1985); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.935
(Baldwin 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17013 (West Supp. 1990); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.651(9) (West 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.2 (West Supp. 1990);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2404 (McKinney Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 5641 (Purdon Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971 (1988).
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1690-1691 (West Supp. 1990); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-348 (1990) (hospital inpatients' opportunity to receive
papanicolaou smear); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3701.60 (Anderson 1988) (hospital in-
patients' opportunity to receive uterine cytologic examination); 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.250-
.259.
109. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14191-14192 (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45-78q (West 1981); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 212.345 (Baldwin 1982); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §§ 7003-7004 (1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.225-.325 (1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-6-102 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2974 (1988); 42 C.F.R.
§§ 441.250-.259 (1989).
110. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1603.1(a), 1603.3 (West Supp. 1990); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1201-1202 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. § 381.609 (1990); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 325-16 (Supp. 1989); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 7303-7309
(1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A (1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 18-336 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5133(2) (West Supp. 1990); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007 (1989); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2611 (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 433.045 (1989);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-6-12 to -14 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2 (Supp. 1990); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 146.025 (West 1989).
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blood."...' The physician must provide this summary to the pa-
tient. 1 2 Similarly, with respect to breast cancer treatment, the
California Department of Health Services is required to develop a
standardized written summary to be given by the physician to the
patient informing her of the "advantages, disadvantages, risks and
descriptions of the procedures with regard to medically viable and
efficacious alternative methods of treatment."' 13 Finally, Massa-
chusetts requires that maternity patients receive:
complete information from an admitting hospital on its annual
rate of primary caesarian sections, annual rate of repeat caesarian
sections, ... annual percentage of women who have had a caesa-
rian section who have had a subsequent successful vaginal birth,
annual percentage of deliveries in birthing rooms and labor-deliv-
ery-recovery ... rooms, ... annual percentage which were con-
tinuously externally monitored only, annual percentage which
were continuously internally monitored only, annual percentage
which were monitored both internally and externally, annual per-
centages utilizing intravenous, inductions, augmentation, forceps,
episiotomies, spinals, epidurals and general anesthesia, and its
annual percentage of women breast-feeding upon discharge from
said hospital." 4
Thus, states can and do require a physician to provide a patient
with certain statistical information and a standardized description
and written summary of the risks for medical procedures involving
fundamental rights other than abortion." 5 Similarly, the abortion
procedure should not be exempt from state regulation in this
regard.
Further, the Court's past refusal to countenance state regulation
of the abortion provider is misplaced. Since Roe v. Wade," 6 a wo-
man's right to an abortion could perhaps be better characterized as
a physician's constitutional right to treat his patient as he sees fit
without interference from the state.' 17 In Roe, the Court declared
that "for the period of pregnancy prior to this 'compelling' point
[the end of the first trimester], the attending physician, in consulta-
tion with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the
111. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1645(e) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
112. Id. § 1645(f).
113. Id. § 1704.5 (West 1990). California is not alone with respect to informed con-
sent for breast cancer. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.17013, 333.17513 (West
Supp. 1990).
114. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70E (Supp. 1990).
115. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14191 (West 1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 436.225(1)
(1989); 42 C.F.R. § 441.255(c)(1) (1989).
116. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
117. Asaro, supra note 70, at 59.
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state, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should
be terminated." 11 This view of the abortion right laid the founda-
tion for the Court to strike down informed consent abortion stat-
utes because they " 'straitjacket'" physicians in the exercise of
their professional judgment.' 19 The Akron Court went further, ac-
tually linking the woman's right to an abortion with her physi-
cian's ability to exercise discretion: "because abortion is a medical
procedure, ... full vindication of the woman's fundamental right
necessarily requires that her physician be given 'the room he needs
to make his best medical judgment.' "120
As difficult as it is to find a woman's right to an abortion within
the penumbra of the Constitution, it is astonishing to find that the
same document has been used to protect a physician from state-
established standards for disclosing information relevant to a pa-
tient contemplating an abortion. Not surprisingly, despite such an
alleged "physician's right," states routinely regulate the activities
of professionals, including physicians.' 2' In the end, abortion is
more than a mere "medical procedure." It is an act that raises
profound moral and sociological questions. Just as other medical
issues, such as terminating life support, genetic research, and dis-
closure of positive HIV results to others, are not made solely
within the physician-patient relationship, but rather within param-
eters dictated by the state, so the state permissibly may intrude
upon that relationship over the issue of abortion.
Heretofore, the Court's view of the physician's role has been out-
dated, harkening back to an era of the family physician who sought
only his own counsel in deciding upon treatment but also drew
upon a years-long professional relationship with the patient. Those
times are past, and new settings for care now predominate. 122
Governments and patients now play a far greater role in decid-
ing upon a course of treatment. 123 The large majority of abortions
are performed in clinics whose primary, if not sole, function is to
118. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
119. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445
(1983) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)).
120. Id. at 427 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)). The Court as-
sumes that the physician actually makes a medical judgment, rather than simply acts as a
technician. One commentator noted that a careful reading of the abortion decisions are
as much vindications of the rights of physicians to practice medicine as they are feminist
"pro-choice" victories, if not more so. Asaro, supra note 70, at 59.
121. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 802 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
122. See F. RozovsKY, supra note 7, § 1.1.2.
123. Id.
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perform abortions; 124 the woman is unlikely to meet the operating
physician before the procedure or see the physician again, unless it
is for another abortion. 125 Thus, the physician is unlikely to know
much more about the woman's individual circumstances than
would any member of the state legislature.
In addition, -a clinic's economic survival depends upon women
choosing abortions. There is a strong economic incentive for such
clinics to encourage abortions, 126 unlike the traditional hospital or
physician with a more diverse practice, whose goal is to heal the
patient. Healing is not the goal of an abortion clinic unless an
abortion is the only rational way to deal with an unwanted preg-
nancy. Further, physicians who provide abortions are likely to be
isolated from their professional peers and to feel ostracized and
defensive about their work.127 Such individuals may well lack the
objectivity necessary to see that the patient makes a fully informed
choice. If a state is concerned about a physician's or clinic's objec-
tivity, then regulation is a reasonable and permissible way to pro-
tect its citizens.
Finally, a woman is free to sue a physician after she has an abor-
tion for failure to inform her of particular risks or to provide a fetal
description. 128 A court might even adopt a general rule that failure
to provide certain information to a pregnant woman is malpractice
per se. What the Supreme Court has done is to fashion, without
explanation, a constitutional doctrine that permits, in effect, the
physician's judgment to be second guessed by the state after, but
not before, an abortion. This doctrine is completely without sup-
port in the Constitution.
2. Private Counseling
Section 4(C) of the Model Act requires that:
The information contained herein shall be disclosed to the wo-
124. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
126. "Would you please remember that abortion is not about right, abortion is not
about choices, abortion is.. . about money.... Abortion is a skillfully marketed product
sold to a woman when she needs help. .They don't give her help. The only choice they
have is abortion." Myers, Senate to Debate Abortion Bill, Baton Rouge Morning Advo-
cate, June 21, 1990, at 1A, col. 2 (comments of Carol Everett, a pro-life activist, who at
one time operated a lucrative abortion clinic in Dallas).
127. Abortion Providers Meet to Honor Peers, Wash. Post, May 9, 1990, at 6, col. 4;
Kolata, Under Pressures and Stigma More Doctors Shun Abortion, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8,
1990, at 1, col. 1.
128. See Annotation, Medical Malpractice in Performance of Legal Abortion, 69
A.L.R.4TH 875, 885 (1989).
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man in private to protect her privacy and maintain the confiden-
tiality of the woman's decision, and to ensure that the
information she receives focuses on her individual circumstances.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this type of
provision, it is quite consistent with the Court's repeated admoni-
tions that the information a woman receives must, as a constitu-
tional matter, be tailored to her individual circumstances, and that
abortion is a personal decision, to be made between the woman and
her physician or counselor. 129 Presumably, the provision will add
an additional minimal cost to the abortion procedure. However,
the Supreme Court sustained a Missouri statute that required a
pathology report for each abortion performed, resulting in an ap-
proximate $19.40 increase in cost to the woman, on the basis that it
furthered important health-related concerns. 130 Accordingly, this
provision is consistent with existing Court precedent.
3. One-Day Waiting Period
Section 4(D) of the Model Act mandates a minimum overnight
waiting period for an abortion after the information has been given,
except in certain emergency situations. In Akron, the Court struck
down a twenty-four-hour waiting period because it encroached
upon the physician's exercise of judgment as to whether and for
how long an individual patient should postpone the abortion
procedure. 13
1
As noted earlier, however, the Court now seems more amenable
to state regulation of abortion, including a waiting period.1 32 Fur-
ther, as argued above, the Court's deference to the physician is en-
tirely misplaced. For example, California's informed consent
sterilization statute requires a thirty-day waiting period.1 33 If a
state may impose upon a physician its view of the appropriate wait-
ing period for sterilization, why is it any different legally when it
seeks to do so for abortion? Because most abortions are performed
129. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 762-63 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416, 442-49 (1983); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 & n.8 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
130. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 487 (1983).
131. Akron, 462 U.S. at 450-51.
132. Indeed, the Court, by a six-to-three margin, recently upheld a 24-hour waiting
period and a 48-hour waiting period for parental notice statutes. Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926
(1990).
133. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 70707.1(a)(4) (1986); see also Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 212.347 (Baldwin 1982).
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in clinics, 134 where the physician-patient relationship may be tenu-
ous if not nonexistent, state regulation of abortion is likely to be
less intrusive than for procedures such as breast cancer treatment
and sterilization, for which the physician-patient relationship is
usually much more developed.
4. Description of the Fetus
Section 4(B)(vi) of the Model Act requires the physician to in-
form the woman:
In language designed to be understood by the pregnant woman
given her age, level of maturity, and intellectual capability, the
probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the fetus
she is carrying, based upon information available to the physician
concerning the gestational age and physical development of the
woman's fetus.
The Act further requires in Section 4(B)(vii):
The availability, for the woman's review if she so chooses, of a
fetal model or depiction of a fetus with the probable anatomical
and physiological characteristics as determined pursuant to Sub-
sections (B)(v) and (vi) herein.
Unlike the Akron statute, the Model Act requires only that the
fetus be described; it does not enumerate specific characteristics. 3
Thus, the physician need not speculate about certain unknowable
characteristics. Further, because the details of the fetal description
are left to the discretion of the physician, intrusion into the physi-
cian-patient relationship is limited. The only determination made
by the state under these provisions of the Model Act is that a de-
scription of the fetus is relevant to a woman's decision whether to
abort. Both proponents and opponents of the abortion right have
pointed to physiological characteristics of the fetus to support their
134. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
135. In Akron, the Court struck down a statute requiring that the patient be informed
"in detail [of] the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn
child at the gestational point of development at which time the abortion is to be per-
formed, including, but not limited to, appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including
pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, the presence of internal organs
and the presence of external members." Akron, 462 U.S. at 423 n.5. A majority of the
Court struck down the statute because it was "designed not to inform the woman's con-
sent but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether," and because it required physi-
cians to speculate about some fetal characteristics, such as the unborn child's sensitivity
to pain, which are impossible to deterimine. Id. at 444 & n.34. Further, the statute
"insist[ed] upon recitation of a lengthy and inflexible list of information," without regard
to the woman's individual circumstances, thereby acting as an impermissible straitjacket
upon the physician. Id. at 445.
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positions. 136 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself used a physiological
characteristic-viability-as one of its tests in Roe. 137 Physical ap-
pearance is unquestionably important to our definition of "human-
ity." Without doubt, should an extraterrestrial civilization ever
announce itself to us, we would look first to the physical character-
istics of the beings to judge their similarity to us. Given all of the
above, it is difficult to argue that physical appearance of the fetus is
not relevant, or that a state may not determine that it is relevant as
a matter of law and policy, to the moral decision that each woman
must make in deciding whether to have an abortion. 138
Providing a woman with a description of the fetus that she is
carrying furthers two important state interests. First, information
on fetal development insures that a woman has an opportunity to
make the abortion decision based upon all available objective medi-
cal information. If she is informed about fetal development, she
can act according to her own values. She then will have minimized
the risk of future potential psychological harm arising from post-
operative reflection prompted by obtaining fetal information not
made available to her before the abortion. 139 Offering a woman the
opportunity to receive a minimum level of objective biological and
medical information is necessary to the abortion counseling
process. 14
Second, providing such information furthers the state's interest
in protecting unborn life throughout a woman's pregnancy. As
noted earlier, providing a woman with medical and biological in-
formation, to which she might not otherwise have access, will al-
low her to act in light of her own values to protect the unborn
child.
The Supreme Court, however, has expressed concern that abor-
tion informed consent statutes are motivated by a desire to dis-
suade women from seeking an abortion. 4 ' In articulating its
136. See infra note 138.
137. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973).
138. This Article does not separately review the constitutionality of the fetal model.
Under Thornburgh, this provision would, arguably, be unconstitutional. See Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986). Inexpli-
cably, the Court never addressed the fact that the Thornburgh provision, like that of the
Model Act, is voluntary. Under the Model Act, the physician must inform the woman
that the model is available for her viewing if she chooses. To forbid the patient from
making this choice not only smacks of paternalism, but weakens the holding of Roe.
Even some supporters of legal abortion prefer that the woman be given this opportunity.
See Note, supra note 86, at 510.
139. See supra notes 26, 100-04.
140. See generally Rue, supra note 104.
141. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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concern, the Court has appeared to rely on a type of "purpose"
test. Specifically, the Court has rejected provisions requiring a de-
scription of the fetus or making available for view a picture of a
fetus of approximately the same age as the patient's, because such
requirements are "inflammatory" and designed to discourage a wo-
man from having an abortion. 142
Abortion involves presently unresolvable debates over theologi-
cal, moral, and medical questions about the propriety of taking the
life of a fetus. No one can seriously dispute the state's right ordina-
rily to present evidence as to fetal characteristics. Surely it is rele-
vant evidence and the most objective evidence available in the
abortion debate. 143 For example, a state constitutionally may fund
a massive advertising campaign highlighting the various stages of
fetal development. 144 A woman might even view such an advertise-
ment on a bulletin board immediately outside the abortion clinic.
Yet when this information is required to be disclosed during the
patient consultation, it somehow becomes unconstitutional.
Quite apart from the issue of whether the Court has drawn a
valid distinction here, it is simply incorrect to say that such provi-
sions are inherent attempts by the state to discourage abortion.. If
a state has a statute permitting abortion in given situations, then
the state's interest lies in seeing that the abortion decision is a fully
informed one. Once balanced and truthful information is
presented to the woman, she must then choose. It would be a differ-
142. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762-63 & n.10; City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444-45 (1983). The standard for abortion contains
no formal purpose requirement. In fact, the Court has held that the state may legiti-
mately choose childbirth over abortion. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the Court has, in the past, utilized a de facto purpose requirement. For example,
the Court invalidated portions of the informed consent ordinance in Akron in part be-
cause the regulation was "designed... to persuade [the woman] to withhold [her con-
sent] altogether." Akron, 462 U.S. at 444. Similarly, in Thornburgh, the Court found
that the state legislature's failure to "compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of
necessary surgery or of simple vaccination, reveal[ed] the anti-abortion character of the
statute and its real purpose." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 764. The Model Act is designed
simply to provide a woman with sufficient truthful information and the necessary time to
make an informed choice. Notwithstanding Thornburgh and Akron, a state legislature
that adopts the Model Act, even with the dual intent of protecting the woman and sup-
porting childbirth over abortion, does not infringe on any existing right to abortion.
143. See, e.g., Sagan & Druyan, Is It Possible to Be Pro-Life and Pro-Choice?,
PARADE MAG., Apr. 22, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
144. North Carolina began the "First Steps" campaign in 1990, with an investment
of $10 million, in order to reduce infant mortality. At least two of the campaign's publi-
cations refer to the fetus as a "baby" and list the evolving characteristics of the unborn
child. MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH BRANCH, DIv. OF HEALTH SERVS., N.C. DEPT.
OF HUMAN RESOURCES, HEALTHY PREGNANCY, HEALTHY BABY: A HANDBOOK FOR
EXPECTING MOMS 3-5 (1983); STATE OF N.C., ME AND MY BABY (1990).
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ent situation if the state required the physician to provide false in-
formation on fetal development or to provide only physiological
information tending to support the argument that the fetus should
not be aborted.' 45  The information to be disclosed under the
Model Act is not in and of itself harmful; rather, it is simply fac-
tual. If the woman chooses not to have an abortion, it is not be-
cause the state has dissuaded her, but'rather because she has
received complete information on the physiological characteristics
of her fetus and has made her own decision. She has perceived her
own best interest and acted upon it. It is quite remarkable for the
Court to view the truth as a burden on the exercise of a constitu-
tional right.' 46 It becomes even more so when the issue is the pos-
sible taking of human life and a decision most Americans probably
view as immoral, even if not all are willing to make it unlawful.1 47
Indeed, if providing relevant, balanced, and truthful information
about fetal development to pregnant women dissuades them from
having an abortion, does not this only confirm the legitimacy of the
state's fear that the fetus is being unnecessarily killed through an
uninformed decision? 141
145. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (misleading information is subject to
restraint).
146. The Court has rejected the argument that it is permissible for a state to withhold
information in order to protect its residents. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court held that the best way to pro-
tect the citizens of Virginia was "to open the channels of communication rather than
close them." Id. at 770.
147. In recent Gallup Poll, commissioned by Americans United for Life, 75% of the
respondents said that they believed that abortion involved the taking of human life. New
Gallup Poll Buoys Pro-Lifers, HUMAN EvENTs, March 9, 1991, at 6. The poll also re-
vealed "public ignorance of the status of abortion law." Id (42% of poll respondents
believe that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), authorizes abortions only during the first
trimester; 16% of all respondents believe that even a first trimester abortion "could be
obtained only if the mother's life or health was in danger."). Cf Chapman, When it
Comes to Abortion, the Public Isn't "Pro-Choice", Chicago Tribune, March 21, 1991, at
27, col. 1 ("Most Americans approve of abortions in some cases-the extreme ones. A
sizeable majority thinks it is acceptable in cases of rape and incest, when there is a danger
to the physical or mental health of the mother, and when the baby is likely to be born
with a severe defect.").
148. Justice Blackmun's additional concern that a description of the fetus is inflam-
matory is misplaced. No one seriously disputes the relevance of a description of the fetus
to the abortion decision. It may be inflammatory ordinarily to show the jury a picture of
the bloody corpse in a murder case because that information is not relevant. See G.
LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 44-45, 513 (2d ed. 1987); see also
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 474, 801
(1986) (White, J., dissenting). However, showing the jury a picture of the victim taken
before the murder to show that the victim existed would hardly be inflammatory. It is
not uncommon for abortion clinic workers to describe vaguely the life within the wo-
man's womb. Sontag, supra note 67, at 14, col. 2 (" 'What baby?' [the clinic owner]
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In the recent Cruzan case concerning the right to die,149 the
Court noted that the life or death impact of the decision being reg-
ulated by the state justified "heightened evidentiary requirements"
in evaluating the choice to terminate a patient's life' 5 ° Similarly,
the life or death decision being made by the pregnant woman justi-
fies regulation by the state to ensure that this momentous decision
is a fully informed one.
Finally, when viewed in light of informed consent statutes
outside the abortion context, the Court's purpose inquiry seems
unduly restrictive. Presumably, no legislature would take the time
to pass an informed consent statute for any medical procedure un-
less it determined that there is a real probability that patients are
too often opting unwittingly for that procedure, for example,
choosing mastectomies instead of less radical treatment. Is this
legislative favoritism-seeking to reduce the number of particular
medical procedures performed-reason enough to declare the
statute unconstitutional? Suppose the legislature also requires the
physician to describe what a woman looks like after a mastectomy
or to make illustrations available; is the statute then
unconstitutional?15 1
States could find that some women later regret choosing an ill-
informed mastectomy or sterilization procedure and that prior in-
formation may alleviate the problem. In addition, a legislature
may be concerned about the cost to the state of mastectomies when
other procedures are equally effective but less costly. Or a state
may be concerned about the growing number of sterilizations and
its declining birth rate. Do these concerns, not directly related to
patient welfare, render such statutes unconstitutional? One would
hardly think so. In short, the Court seems to have imposed a pur-
pose requirement upon abortion informed consent statutes merely
because abortion is controversial. Nothing in the Constitution in-
dicates such a result.
answered. 'There's no baby. There's just two periods there that will be cleaned out.' ");
Zekman & Warrick, Soft Voices, Hard Sells-Twin Swindle, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov.
17, 1978, at 22, col. 2 ("We got no [counseling] training except in what not to say. How
not to use words like 'fetus' or 'kill' that might scare the customers away.").
149. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
150. Id. at 2852-53.
151. One could argue that in this example the state is trying to dissuade the woman
from choosing one form of treatment, not from foregoing the treatment altogether as is
the case with abortion. Without conceding that this distinction makes any difference,
informed consent statutes for sterilization involve a choice between treatment and no
treatment. Yet there appears to be little or no concern that the state is trying to dissuade
individuals from seeking sterilization.
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5. Duty to Preserve Live Birth Fetus
Section 4(B)C(viii) requires the physician to inform the woman:
That if the woman's fetus has reached the stage of viability,
and if the abortion procedure results in the premature birth of
the live child, the attending physician has the legal obligation to
take all steps necessary to maintain the life and health of the
child. The disclosure required in this Subsection need not be
given when the attending physician has determined, with reason-
able medical certainty, that the fetus has not reached the stage of
viability.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of a
provision such as this one. Nevertheless, it is the type of accurate
and nonobjectionable information accepted by the Court in Ak-
ron, 152 particularly considering the state's compelling interest in
protecting a postviable child.
IV. CONCLUSION
In its decisions on abortion informed consent statutes, the
Supreme Court has struggled with what it views as the often com-
peting interests of the woman's right to choose an abortion, the
state's interest in protecting unborn life, and the physician's right
to an unregulated practice. The Model Woman's Informed
Choices Act discussed in this Article is constructed in accord with
the balance struck by the Court in this area.
More importantly, this Article has suggested that the Court in-
correctly views these interests as competing. Abortion informed
consent statutes serve to insure that the woman exercises her right
to choose whether to have an abortion in a knowing and fully in-
formed manner. The information necessary to that decision in-
cludes not only the medical and emotional risks inherent in the
abortion procedure, but also the physiological characteristics of the
life that is within her. The abortion decision is both medical and
moral and cannot be made knowingly without consideration of the
life of the fetus; for if there is one thing on which both pro-life and
pro-choice advocates agree, it is that the fetus represents at least a
potential human life. It would be a strange result indeed if the
state could not constitutionally require the woman to consider ob-
jective information relevant to that life as part of her abortion
decision.
Nor is the physician hamstrung by such a statute. Gone are the
152. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445 n.37
(1983).
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days when the physician operated largely outside of governmental
regulation. Today, both statutes and common law extensively reg-
ulate the informed consent dialogue between physician and patient.
Moreover, the physician-patient relationship considered so sacro-
sanct in earlier abortion decisions is usually non-existent in the
abortion context, and the Model Act is drafted to avoid undue in-
terference with that relationship in the rare circumstance where
one exists.
In short, the Court previously erected protective walls around its
newly found and controversial right to an abortion, often seeming
to protect abortion itself rather than the right to choose abor-
tion. 153 Even as it continues to fashion what Justice Scalia has
termed an "abortion code,"' 15 4 the Court has begun to tear down
those walls.
153. One commentator has observed that the Court's holdings in certain abortion
cases seem driven more by anger over continued opposition to Roe v. Wade than by the
merits of the particular case. See Moses, The Role of the Legislative and Executive
Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 380, 382 (1988).
154. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2961 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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APPENDIX
Model Woman's Informed Choices Act
Section 1. Short Title
This Act shall be known as the "Woman's Informed Choices
Act."
Section 2. Legislative Purposes and Findings
A. The knowledgeable exercise of a woman's decision to have
an abortion depends on the extent to which the woman receives
sufficient information to make an informed choice between two al-
ternatives of great consequence: carrying a child to birth or termi-
nating the pregnancy.
B. The purpose of this Act is to ensure that prior to the per-
formance of an abortion, every woman shall be counseled and
given a full range of information regarding her available alterna-
tives and that every woman shall give her voluntary, knowledgea-
ble and informed consent to the abortion procedure.
C. This legislature believes it is essential to the psychological
and physical well-being of a woman considering an abortion that
she receive complete and accurate information on all options avail-
able to her in dealing with her pregnancy.
D. Because the vast majority of abortions in this State are per-
formed in clinics devoted solely to providing abortions and family
planning services, women who seek abortions at these facilities
normally do not (i) have a prior patient-physician relationship with
the abortionist; (ii) return to the facility for post-surgical care; and
(iii) continue a patient-physician relationship with the abortionist.
In most instances, the woman's only actual contact with the abor-
tionist occurs simultaneously with the abortion procedure, with lit-
tle opportunity to receive counsel concerning her decision.
Because of this, the legislature believes that certain safeguards are
necessary to protect a woman's right to choose the option best
suited to her particular situation.
E. A further purpose of this Act is to acknowledge this State's
interest in protecting unborn children from a woman's uninformed
decision to terminate her pregnancy.
F. This legislature believes it is essential to the safeguarding of
its interest in protecting unborn children that the woman receive
factual, medical and biological information about her unborn
child. The dissemination of the information set forth herein is im-
perative because of the significance of the act of abortion and the
1991]
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often stressful circumstances under which the abortion decision is
made.
G. The safeguards that will best protect a woman seeking ad-
vice concerning abortion include the following:
(i) Private, individual counseling, including dissemination of
certain information, as the woman's individual circumstances
dictate, relevant to the decision whether to choose an abortion;
and
(ii) A short waiting period between a woman's receiving infor-
mation designed to assist in making an informed choice and the
actual performance of the abortion procedure, if that is the
choice that she makes.
The legislature finds that these safeguards advance the woman's
interests in the exercise of her decision on whether to choose an
abortion and are justified by the objective of this State to protect
the health of women and that of unborn children.
Section 3. Definitions
A. "Abortion" means the use of any instrument, medicine,
drug, or other substance or device with the intent to cause the
death of a live fetus which is existing within the womb of a woman
known to be pregnant.
B. "Fetus" means an individual organism of the species homo
sapien from conception until live birth.
C. "Viability" and "viable" mean the stage of physical devel-
opment at which the life of a fetus may potentially be continued
separate from the woman, by natural means or with the assistance
of artificial life-support systems.
D. "Physician" means any person licensed to practice
medicine under the laws of this State.
E. "Qualified person assisting the physician" means a physi-
cian, psychologist, licensed social worker, licensed professional
counselor, or registered nurse.
Section 4. Voluntary and Informed Consent
A. An abortion otherwise permitted by law shall not be per-
formed or induced except with the informed written consent of the
pregnant woman, such consent given freely and without coercion.
B. Pursuant to Subsection (A) of this Section, an abortion shall
not be performed or induced upon a pregnant woman unless she
has been orally informed by her attending physician, or a qualified
person assisting the physician, of the following information, given
the opportunity to ask questions she may have, and, based on her
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consideration of this information, signed a consent form acknowl-
edging that she has been informed of the following:
(i) That according to the best medical judgment of a physician
she is pregnant;
(ii) The name of the physician who will perform the abortion;
(lii) That she is free to withhold or withdraw her consent to
the abortion procedure at any time before the abortion without
affecting the right to future care or treatment and without loss or
withdrawal of any state or federally funded benefits to which she
might otherwise be entitled;
(iv) That abortion is a medical procedure with certain foresee-
able physical and psychological risks, including (a) retained tis-
sue of conception; (b) damage to the cervix; (c) hemorrhage; (d)
infection; (e) perforation of the uterus; (f) sterility; (g) complica-
tion of future pregnancies; (h) death; (i) posttraumatic stress dis-
order; (j) severe depression; (k) anniversary syndrome; (1) sexual
dysfunction; and (in) interference with personal relationships,
and the physician's judgment as to the degree of risk faced by the
woman as to each of the above, as well as such other risks as the
physician deems relevant to the woman.
(v) The number of weeks elapsed from the probable time of
conception of the fetus, based upon (a) information provided by
her as to her last menstrual period and/or other reliable informa-
tion commonly used in determining the point of conception; or
(b) appropriate physical and laboratory tests.
(vi) In language designed to be understood by the pregnant
woman taking into account her age, level of maturity, and intel-
lectual capability, the probable anatomical and physiological
characteristics of the fetus she is carrying, based upon informa-
tion available to the physician concerning the gestational age and
physical development of the woman's fetus.
(vii) The availability, for the woman's review if she so chooses,
of a fetal model or depiction of a fetus with the probable anatom-
ical and physiological characteristics as determined by the physi-
cian pursuant to Subsections (B)(v) and (vi) herein.
(viii) That if the woman's fetus has reached the stage of viabil-
ity, and if the abortion procedure results in the premature birth
of the live child, the attending physician has the legal obligation
to take all steps necessary to maintain the life and health of the
child. The disclosure required in this Subsection need not be
given when the attending physician has determined, with reason-
able medical certainty, that the fetus has not reached the stage of
viability.
(ix) An explanation of the medical or surgical method of re-
moving the fetus that will be utilized in performing the abortion.
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(x) The availability of services provided by public and private
agencies to assist the woman during her pregnancy and after the
birth of her child in the event the woman chooses not to abort the
fetus, including services relating to adoption, or, if she chooses to
abort, names of groups that counsel women who have had abor-
tions. The physician or qualified person assisting the physician
shall provide the woman with a list of such agencies upon the
woman's request. This list is to be promulgated by the State De-
partment of Health and shall be updated annually, pursuant to
rulemaking procedures established by the Department.
(xi) An explanation of what to do and whom to call (including
appropriate telephone numbers) should complications arise after
the abortion.
C. The information contained herein shall be disclosed to the
woman in private to protect her privacy and maintain the confiden-
tiality of the woman's decision, and to ensure that the information
she receives focuses on her individual circumstances.
D. No abortion shall be performed earlier than the day follow-
ing the disclosure of the information as set forth in Subsection (B)
herein, unless the attending physician, utilizing his experience,
judgment and professional competence, determines that any wait-
ing period would endanger the life of the pregnant woman.
If the physician determines that the life of the pregnant woman
is endangered, the abortion may be performed after disclosure of
the required information and the signing of the consent form refer-
enced herein. The attending physician shall maintain a written
record identifying the medical basis upon which the decision that
the abortion is immediately necessary is based.
E. Prior to performing the abortion, the attending physician
performing or inducing the abortion shall provide the pregnant
woman with a duplicate copy of the consent form signed by her
and shall verify that all information required to be given the wo-
man was provided her, unless the attending physician provided
such information initially. The attending physician shall also in-
form the pregnant woman of her right to withdraw her consent,
and of his continuing obligation to provide follow-up services
should there be any complications after the abortion.
F. A written consent form meeting the requirements set forth
in this Section and signed by the pregnant woman shall be pre-
sumed valid. Such presumption may be overcome by evidence suf-
ficient to establish that such consent was obtained through fraud,
negligence, deception, misrepresentation, coercion, duress, or
omission of a material fact.
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Section 5. Penalties
A violation of this Act by a physician or qualified person assist-
ing the physician is a Class - Misdemeanor.
Section 6. Civil Remedies
A. Notwithstanding any other provisions of the laws of this
State, failure to comply with the requirements of this Act shall pro-
vide a basis for a civil malpractice action for damages against the
attending physician, the qualified person assisting the physician, or
the hospital, clinic, ambulatory surgical treatment center, profes-
sional corporation, or partnership with which the attending physi-
cian or qualified person assisting the physician is associated, upon a
showing of each the following:
(i) The woman suffered harm to her physical, mental, or emo-
tional health as a result of the abortion or the failure to provide
information relevant to her informed consent;
(ii) The information concerning the risk or possibility of such
harm was not disclosed as required by this Act; and
(iii) The woman would not have consented to the abortion had
the requirements of this Act been met.
Section 7. Severability
The provisions of this Act are declared to be severable, and if
any provision, word, phrase, or clause of this Act or the applica-
tion thereof to any person shall be held invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this Act.
Section 8. Construction
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as creating or recognizing
a right to legal abortion.
1991]

